TCP Stealth

Port Knocking Advanced

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Agenda

- Who & why?
- A bit of history
- The idea
- The implementation
- Show
- And?

Who & Why

Me :-)

- Teacher of mathematics and physics
- PhD in experimental physics
- Started with Linux in 1996
- Linux/UNIX trainer
- s+c: 2002-2005
- @Amadeus:
  - Linux Admin, Strategy, Automation
  - Architecture & Technical Governance

Why not?

- Security by obscurity
- Port knocking daemon – SPOF
- IP address spoofing
- … and more

Why?

- Brute force login attacks
- Technical evolution
- Snowden disclosures
  - Computer power
  - Country-wide port-scans

A Bit of History

Looking back and around

- Not new
- Several implementations
- Normally 3 parties
- 'Knocking' differences
- E.g. http://www.portknocking.org/

Traditional Port Knocking Procedure

I. Connection attempt by client to server => blocked by firewall

II. Knock sequence performed by client => verified by Port Knocking daemon

III. Port-Knocking daemon instructs firewall

IV. 2nd Connection attempt by client => granted by firewall

Traditional Port Knocking Setup



Further downsides

- Additional network packets
- Man-in-the-Middle attacks
- Protocol-dependent port behaviour

The Idea

Project roots

- TU Munich
- Previously called 'Knock'
- Summer course 2013
- Master thesis 2014

TCP only!?!

- Well-used
- UDP limitations, e.g syslog, DNS
- Widely used for TLS/SSL



First Thoughts

- Avoid additional packets
- Hide information in protocol header
  - 'Steganography'
  - Limitations per design
  - RFC 793 (and successors)
- Shared Secret
- Not new => Silentknock (1997)

TCP Header – potential candidates



- Initial Sequence Number (ISN)
- Acknowledgement Number (ACK)?
- Timestamps?

ISN as a Carrier Medium

- 32 Bit
- Input data
  - Shared Secret
  - Target IP
  - Target Port
  - Time
- Generation via MD5

Implementation

About Sockets

- Change of TCP implementation
- Client AND Server
- Linux/BSD
  - Kernel
    - tcp_v4/6_connect()
    - tcp_v4/6_do_rcv()
  - Application
    - setsockopt()

Linux Kernel with TCP Stealth



Socket changes for closed source

- Helper library
  - *libknockify*
  - *LD_PRELOAD*
  - Overlay of system calls
    - listen()
    - connect()
- A bit flaky
- Not recommended => 'just a hack'

Stealth Socket Example

```
$cattcp_stealth_server.c
...
#defineTCP_STEALTH   26
...
 charsecret[64]="ThisismymagicID!";
...
 if(setsockopt(sock,IPPROTO_TCP,TCP_STEALTH,secret,sizeof(secret))){
   printf("setsockopt()failed,%s\n",strerror(errno));
   return1;
 }
...
$
```

Man in the Middle .. Still possible!?!

- Duty of application .. yes .. but ..
- Small but real attack vector
- Data integrity check!!

TCP Stealth – Data Integrity Check I

- Input data
  - PSK
  - Additional information
- MD5*)
- Split and XOR => 16 Bit
- 2nd part of ISN :-)

*) Debateable!

TCP Stealth – Data Integrity Check II



TCP Stealth – Retransmissions

- Traditional TCP => new timestamp
- TCP Stealth
  - Timestamp => ISN calculation
  - Use same/old timestamp

Show

Example – The Scene

- Patched Linux kernel 3.19rc1
- Patched SSHD with TCP Stealth enabled
- Configured as service using port 10022

```
#
# uname -r
3.19.0-rc1
#
# cat /etc/systemd/system/sshd-knock.service
[Unit]
Description=Knockified OpenSSH server daemon
After=network.target sshd-keygen.service
Wants=sshd-keygen.service

[Service]
EnvironmentFile=/etc/sysconfig/sshd
ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
KillMode=process
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=42s

[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
#
#
#
```

Example – The Show

- http://youtu.be/7CadOVTNxr4 :-)



And?

Bits and Pieces

- Not part of Vanilla kernel
  - First trial in DEC 2013
  - Last one in DEC 2014
- No plans by Linux distributors
  - True for Enterprise
  - True for Community :-(
  - Not true for Knoppix :-)
- IETF mailing list discussions
  - Not using ISN
  - Using Tsval/Tsecr
  - No real follow-up yet

Summary

- Promising project
- Good documentation
- Addresses known challenges
- Upstream integration outstanding …

  … and important if not crucial

References

- http://gnunet.org/knock
- http://gnunet.org/sites/default/files/ma_kirsch_2014_0.pdf
- http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kirsch-ietf-tcp-stealth-01
- http://github.com/useidel/knock

Check it out
Provide feedback
http://gnunet.org/knock

Thank you.